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FOUR RESPONSES TO CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP
Michael Coenen*
ABSTRACT
Sometimes government action implicates more than one constitutional right. For
example, a prohibition on religious expression might be said to violate both the Free
Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, a rule regarding same-sex marriage might
be said to violate both equal protection and substantive due process, an exercise of
the eminent domain power might be said to violate both procedural due process and
the Takings Clause, a disproportionate criminal sentence based on judge-found facts
might be said to violate both the defendant’s right to trial by jury and that defendant’s
right against cruel and unusual punishment, and so forth. In cases such as these, how
should courts respond to the fact that multiple, rights-based rules bring themselves
to bear on the constitutional validity of the government action under review?
This Essay describes four different doctrinal responses that courts might pursue
when confronting such instances of “constitutional overlap.” Specifically, where a
single government action plausibly implicates the protections of multiple, rights-based
rules, courts might: (1) separate the overlapping rules and apply each one without
reference to any of the others; (2) combine the overlapping rules and find in their col-
lective, cumulative force an independently sufficient basis for invalidating the action
under review; (3) consolidate the overlapping rules to yield a single analytical frame-
work said to effectuate the overlapping rules’ redundant commands; or (4) displace
all but one of the overlapping rules by identifying a single such rule as the exclusive
ground for decision. With this descriptive taxonomy on the table, the Essay goes on
to offer some tentative prescriptive suggestions, aimed at assisting courts in identify-
ing the appropriate response to overlap in a given constitutional case.
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INTRODUCTION
Though billed as a book about the First Amendment, Timothy Zick’s The Dy-
namic Free Speech Clause addresses much more than just that.1 In discussing the
First Amendment’s relationship to other rights-based protections, Professor Zick ends
up shedding valuable new light on the broader, trans-substantive phenomenon of
“rights dynamism”2—namely, the family of processes through which constitutional
rights (including but not limited to the free-speech right) “interact, associate, con-
verse, and conflict with one another.”3 Here and elsewhere,4 Zick has catalogued and
analyzed the ways in which discretely defined areas of rights-based law end up
informing one another’s substance and influencing one another’s application, thus
rendering the overall development of rights-based doctrine sensitive to the many
sorts of linkages and entanglements that bring together its (nominally) separate parts.
By running with this holistic perspective on rights-based law, Zick manages to high-
light problems and possibilities that our traditional, more atomized accounts of
constitutional doctrine too often obscure.
Rights dynamism, as Zick’s expansive treatment makes clear, can manifest itself
in a variety of ways.5 Here, however, I will focus my efforts on a subcategory of the
1 See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2018).
2 This is a term that Professor Zick borrows from Jack Balkin, see Jack M. Balkin, Digital
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2004), although Zick ends up ascribing to the term a some-
what different and more specific meaning. See ZICK, supra note 1, at 18.
3 ZICK, supra note 1, at 17.
4 See Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791, 801 (2017) [hereinafter
Zick, Rights Dynamism]; Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014)
[hereinafter Zick, Rights Speech]; Timothy Zick, The Dynamic Relationship Between Freedom
of Speech and Equality, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 45, 75 (2016).
5 See generally Zick, Rights Dynamism, supra note 4, at 797–801. For example, rights
dynamism can emerge when one constitutional right draws on or otherwise makes reference
to others; one need look no further than the Fourteenth Amendment’s “incorporation” of most
of the Bill of Rights for an example of this dynamic in action. See id. at 797. Relatedly, rights
dynamism can emerge when doctrinal insights and innovations from one area of doctrine end
up migrating to and influencing developments within others; one can see this dynamic at work
in the lower courts’ willingness to “borrow” tests long associated with the First Amendment
in articulating frameworks for modern-day Second Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Zick, Rights
2019] FOUR RESPONSES TO CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP 349
phenomenon that I call “constitutional overlap.”6 Constitutional overlap arises when-
ever multiple, ostensibly separate rights provide resonant and mutually supportive
rationales for invalidating the same government action. Sometimes the existence of
an overlap is obvious and its scope is substantial (it is not hard to see, for instance,
how the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Press Clauses overlap with respect
to the censorship of newspapers); at other times, its existence is subtle and its scope
more particularized (the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable seizures
may not seem to have much to do with the First Amendment’s right to free expres-
sion, but the two rights might overlap with respect to arrests made in retaliation for
expressive conduct). But across all instances of overlap, the same functional dynamic
is at work: two or more rights-based protections come to occupy a shared territory,
with the rights simultaneously speaking to the constitutionality of something the
government has done. The question I want to consider here is how, if at all, courts
might ascribe significance to the fact that multiple rules have overlapped.
The general phenomenon of constitutional overlap is by no means a new discov-
ery on my part. Professor Zick’s own work examines instances in which the free-
speech right overlaps with other constitutional rights,7 and other scholars have already
been thinking about the ways in which the existence of overlap might carry signifi-
cance across a wide range of doctrinal contexts.8 But much of the existing work (my
Speech, supra note 4, at 27–35. See generally Joseph Blocher & Luke Morgan, Doctrinal
Dynamism, Borrowing, and the Relationship Between Rules and Rights, 28 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 319 (2019); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 459, 463 (2010). Rights dynamism can also emerge when one constitutional right operates
to facilitate the realization or expansion of others, as might happen, for instance, when the
free-speech right empowers activists and social movements to push for equality rights. See
Zick, Rights Dynamism, supra note 4, at 799; see also CARLOS BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY 1 (2017) (highlighting the “crucial role that
the First Amendment has played in creating the political, social, and legal conditions that have
permitted sexuality-based identities and communities to form and thrive while allowing the
LGBT movement to achieve many of its objectives”). And, contrastingly, rights dynamism
can emerge when constitutional rights end up in conflicts and clashes, as might occur, for in-
stance, where two or more rights give rise to inconsistent-seeming doctrinal commands, see,
e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (noting that the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause “are frequently in tension”), or when one constitutional right empowers
some private individuals to frustrate others’ vindication of another such right, see, e.g., ZICK,
supra note 1, at 187 (highlighting circumstances in which anti-abortion protests protected by
the First Amendment have operated to limit access to constitutionally guaranteed abortion
services). These are but a few of the many different ways in which constitutional rights can
interact and interrelate.
6 See discussion infra Part I.
7 See, e.g., ZICK, supra note 1, at 128–35 (discussing the overlapping applicability of the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses).
8 See, e.g., BALL, supra note 5, at 1–2; Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative
Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1324–43 (2017); Blocher & Morgan, supra note
5; Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2016);
David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW.
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own included) has viewed the phenomenon through a somewhat particularized lens,
focusing on the specific question of whether overlapping rules can and should be
“aggregated,” “combined,” or otherwise accorded “cumulative” force.9 This is a move
that courts and judges have sometimes endorsed and at other times rejected,10 and
their mixed pronouncements on the subject have thus left much room for both de-
scriptive synthesis and normative evaluation. It is, therefore, not surprising that existing
scholarship on constitutional overlap has focused primarily on the appropriateness and
desirability of “combination analysis,” treating the question of what to do when rights
overlap as just another way of asking whether or not the rights should be combined.11
But on further reflection, and with the aid of Professor Zick’s illuminating work,
I have come to believe that the presence of overlap implicates more than just the pros-
pect of combination. In fact, the menu of possible responses to constitutional overlap
is lengthier and more complicated than the “to combine or not to combine” question
would suggest, and we would therefore do well to develop a more complete accounting
of the different means by which courts might work with overlapping, rights-based rules.
I aim to begin that task in this Essay, by introducing and examining what I perceive
to be four meaningful different doctrinal responses to constitutional overlap, each of
which enjoys a real and substantial presence within modern-day constitutional law.
Specifically, when reviewing government action that simultaneously implicates
two or more rights-based protections, courts might: (1) separate the overlapping rights
and apply each one without reference to the other;12 (2) combine the overlapping
rights and find in their collective, cumulative force an independently sufficient basis
for invalidating the action under review (even where neither right provides such a basis
on its own);13 (3) apply a single, consolidated rule that simultaneously implements
U. L. REV. 641, 643–44 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman, Madisonian Balancing]; David L.
Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1994)
[hereinafter Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality]; Scott W. Howe, Constitutional Clause
Aggregation and the Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779, 829–61 (2018); Ariel
Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 48–53 (2012); Tebbe & Tsai,
supra note 5, at 463.
9 See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 1324–43; Coenen, supra note 8, at 1070;
Faigman, Madisonian Balancing, supra note 8, at 643–44; Faigman, Measuring Constitutional-
ity, supra note 8, at 755; Howe, supra note 8, at 829–61; Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 48–53.
10 For a sampling of real-world examples, see Coenen, supra note 8, at 1078–82.
11 To be clear, I do not mean here to suggest that existing scholarship has been monolithic
in its treatment of combination analysis itself—much to the contrary, several commentators
have usefully distinguished between different sorts of ways in which courts accord aggregate
or cumulative effect to overlapping constitutional rights. See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra
note 8, at 1313 (distinguishing between “hybrid rights” claims, according to which a claimant
“argues that the existence of partial violations of multiple constitutional provisions should
be added together,” and “intersectional rights” claims, according to which “the [overlapping]
constitutional provisions are read to inform and bolster one another”).
12 See discussion infra Section II.A.
13 See discussion infra Section II.B.
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the protections derived from each individual right;14 or (4) identify one of the over-
lapping rights as displacing all others and thus supplying the exclusively applicable
ground for decision.15 Thus, in my view, the question of how to respond to constitu-
tional overlap reduces not so much to the question of whether or not to combine, but
rather to the question of whether to separate, combine, consolidate, or displace.
In the pages that follow, I attempt to elaborate on this idea. Part I offers a more
extended treatment of the concept of “constitutional overlap,” by defining the
phenomenon more specifically and distinguishing it from several other sorts of
relational interactions that figure prominently within Zick’s own work.16 Part II
develops the taxonomy of responses, by describing and illustrating the four basic
ways in which courts might approach overlapping rules.17 Finally, Part III begins to
wrestle with the normative question of how courts ought to choose the right re-
sponse, setting forth some prescriptive suggestions that might help to guide courts’
choices among the four responses.18
Much of the ensuing analysis is tentative and preliminary. The taxonomy itself is
certainly up for debate—perhaps there are other types of responses to constitutional
overlap, and perhaps there is a better organizational framework for thinking through
the responses I have described. In addition, the normative discussion leaves much
unresolved: I lack both the page space and know-how to develop a comprehensive
formula for responding to overlap, and my prescriptive suggestions aim more to high-
light questions worth asking than to resolve those questions definitively. More work
on these and other issues no doubt needs to be done. But my hope is that this discussion
will at least make the case for thinking more systematically about the phenomenon
of constitutional overlap and its relationship to the development of constitutional law.
I. WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP?
An instance of “constitutional overlap” arises when multiple constitutional rules
provide plausible and independent bases for concluding that a single government
14 See discussion infra Section II.C.
15 See discussion infra Section II.D.
16 See discussion infra Part I.
17 See discussion infra Part II.
18 See discussion infra Part III. One important caveat regarding the scope of the ensuing
analysis: I am bracketing for purposes of this Essay the question of how, if at all, the pres-
ence of constitutional overlap ought to matter when it comes to assigning remedies for dem-
onstrated constitutional violations. I am not here considering, for instance, whether courts
might under certain circumstances accord different forms of prospective and/or retrospective
remediation to actions that violate two constitutional rules independently, only one of the two
rules, a redundant protection associated with both of the rules, a hybridized version of the
two rules, or some other variation on the theme. The remedy-related issues concerning con-
stitutional overlap strike me as deeply interesting and undoubtedly worthy of further research,
but they are issues I do not take up here. Rather, this Essay deals with the antecedent question
of how courts should respond to constitutional overlap for purposes of determining whether or
not a constitutional violation has occurred.
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action is unconstitutional.19 The “zone of overlap” that exists across a collection of
constitutional rules can thus be defined as the set of government actions that gener-
ate instances of overlap between or among those rules. Two constitutional rules
might thus qualify as highly or substantially overlapping if those provisions are
often simultaneously implicated by a single government action; two other provisions
might qualify as seldom or rarely overlapping if they do not often come together in
this way. We might say, for instance, that First Amendment–based protections of
religious freedom enjoy a significant degree of overlap with First Amendment–based
protections of expressive freedom, given that governmental restrictions on religiously
motivated activity very often operate as restrictions on expressive activity as well.20
By contrast, religious-freedom protections would have a lower degree of overlap with
Second Amendment–based restrictions on gun control measures, given that restric-
tions on religiously motivated activity do not often affect an individual’s ability to
own or possess a firearm. That’s not to say that free-exercise/free-speech overlaps are
inevitable, or that free-exercise/right-to-bear-arms overlaps are impossible—some
governmental restrictions on religious activity might implicate only non-expressive
varieties of such activity, whereas other such restrictions might end up touching on
gun-related activity. But in general, our definition would allow us to say that the
degree of overlap between free-exercise rights and free-speech rights is greater than
the degree of overlap between free-exercise rights and the right to bear arms. And this
is so for the simple reason that we will more often encounter forms of government
action that is constitutionally suspect on both free-speech and free-exercise grounds.21
Given that the degree of constitutional overlap depends on the frequency with
which instances of overlap arise, we should further specify what an instance of
overlap entails. Several features of the definition warrant elaboration. First is the
requirement that the overlapping rules each create plausible grounds for invalidating
a governmental action. Instances of overlap do not arise, in other words, simply
because a claimant has asserted some set of frivolous claims. (Thus, for instance, our
definition would exclude from its scope a case in which a claimant contends (plausi-
bly) that a gun control measure violates her Second Amendment right to bear arms
19 Note that constitutional overlap might also occur in the context of Congress’s enumerated
powers, each one of which might independently provide a plausible basis for upholding fed-
eral legislation as authorized by Article I. See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1086–89. Constitutional
overlap might also arise between a rights-based rule and a power-based rule, as might occur,
for instance, where Congressional action is simultaneously alleged to violate an individual
right and also to fall outside the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. See id. at 1082–86.
Given this Symposium’s emphasis on rights-based protections, however, I will be focusing ex-
clusively on cases in which constitutional rules function as potential grounds for invalidating
the government action under review.
20 See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and
a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 317 (1994) (“Rights
of free speech and free exercise frequently overlap, and many of the Supreme Court’s ‘religion
clause’ cases can be equally well characterized as ‘speech’ cases.”).
21 See ZICK, supra note 1, at 129–32, 134; Brant, supra note 20, at 317.
2019] FOUR RESPONSES TO CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP 353
and (implausibly) that it also abridges her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.) At
the same time, the “plausibility” criterion encompasses more than only those claims
that are definitively and self-evidently meritorious;22 overlap can also arise when
multiple rules each provide merely an “arguable,” “potential,” or even “colorable”
basis for invalidating the same government action.
A second noteworthy feature of the definition is its reference to a “single gov-
ernment action.” That qualifier operates to filter out cases in which multiple actions
implicate multiple, respective claims. Consider, for example, a case in which a crimi-
nal defendant asserts a Fourth Amendment–based challenge to evidence introduced
at trial followed by an Eighth Amendment–based challenge to the terms of the sen-
tence ultimately imposed. This scenario, in my view, would not present an instance of
constitutional overlap, because the two rights-based claims would each concern a
different “government action”: The Fourth Amendment claim goes to the validity
of a search that investigators have conducted, and the Eighth Amendment claim
goes to the validity of a sentence the court has imposed. That’s not to say that the
“singularity” of governmental action will always be self-evident; much to the contrary,
the boundaries of “transactional unity” are hardly self-defining, and reasonable
minds can often differ as to whether a case involves overlapping constitutional ob-
jections to a single governmental action or several, separate objections to a series of
such actions.23 (If, for instance, the severity of one’s sentence was specifically based
on a factual finding that the unlawfully acquired evidence helped to support, then
there would be a stronger—though not necessarily overwhelming—basis for suggest-
ing that the sentence itself implicated the overlapping protections of the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments.24) There are, in short, likely to be cases in which it becomes
very difficult to distinguish between a single government “action” that implicates
22 This is, to be clear, a primarily expositional choice. One could simply define “constitu-
tional overlap” as occurring only where multiple, rights-based rules each definitively demon-
strate the unconstitutionality of government action. But then the question of how to respond
to constitutional overlap would become largely beside the point; the result of the case is fore-
ordained, and the fact that multiple clauses point to the same result carries no analytical
significance. I have thus defined the concept so as to ensure that it encompasses those cases
that I find the most interesting and/or challenging to resolve—i.e., those in which the chosen
response to constitutional overlap might carry outcome-determinative effects.
23 Related problems can arise in the absence of constitutional overlap. Thus, as Professors
Abrams and Garrett have illustrated, some Eighth Amendment challenges to the conditions
of one’s confinement will depend on whether “the relevant transaction” is defined “broadly,”
to encompass the entirety of one’s experience in custody, or “narrowly,” so as “to require
separate litigation of different acts.” Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 1322–23 (citing Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).
24 To flesh out the point, the challenged action would be the imposition of the sentence,
which, could be said to implicate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights (on the theory that,
absent the allegedly unlawful search, the sentence would have been lower) and Eighth Amend-
ment rights (on the theory that the sentence might qualify as so excessive as to amount to a
form of “cruel and unusual punishment”).
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multiple rights, on the one hand, and multiple government actions that each impli-
cate a single right, on the other, and I’m afraid I don’t have much to offer here in the
way of useful clarifying criteria.25 Outside these boundary cases, however, we should
at least be willing to resist the suggestion that constitutional overlap arises whenever
a single constitutional case involves multiple constitutional claims; rather, the pres-
ence of overlap should depend on whether those claims all concern the validity of
one and the same “action” undertaken by the government.
Consider next the definition’s reference to “multiple constitutional rules.” As
I understand it, a constitutional rule is different from a constitutional clause; a case
can involve constitutional overlap even where government action implicates differ-
ent doctrinal principles that stem from the same textual guarantee. Thus an instance
of constitutional overlap would arise when, for instance, a claimant asserts that the
government has violated both the “procedural” and “substantive” components of the
Due Process Clause, or when a defendant contends that a warrantless search was not
justified by “exigent circumstances” and that it was also unsupported by probable
cause. Here too, to be sure, tricky characterization problems will sometimes arise:
As the relevant doctrinal propositions become narrower and more fact-dependent in
character, they may at some point start to look more like statements about a single
rule’s application rather than multiple rules that each individually apply.26 What do
we say, for instance, where a claimant relies on two different theories, each grounded
on a different set of cases, in support of the conclusion that the government violated
their right against compelled speech: Does the claimant now rely on two overlapping
“sub-rules” concerning the right against compelled speech, or is the claimant simply
pointing to two different reasons why the government has violated the single rule
against compelled speech violation? Here again, I doubt there is a rigorous and
airtight means of drawing such fine distinctions.27 But I also do not think that the
lack of a clear approach presents an especially significant problem for the analysis
that follows. For now, we will simply concede that there is a hazy boundary-line
between instances in which rules overlap and those in which reasons overlap, while
confining our analysis to cases in which the overlap itself rather clearly involves
distinctly identifiable rules.
Finally, note the definition’s requirement that the overlapping rules provide in-
dependent bases for a given constitutional outcome. This criterion helps to distinguish
25 For further discussion of this issue, see Coenen, supra note 8, at 1128–30 (highlighting
the problem of “transactional unity”). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions
in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002) (highlighting a broad range of circumstances
in which assessments of constitutional harm are sensitive to seemingly arbitrary choices about
how to frame the relevant transaction whose harm is to be assessed).
26 See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 5, at 325 (noting the “challenge of stating rules,”
which stems from the fact that “[n]early any rule can be stated at varying levels of specificity”).
27 See Michael Coenen, Characterizing Constitutional Inputs, 67 DUKE L.J. 743, 768–70
(2018) (highlighting, within the qualified immunity context, the various ways in which courts
might characterize the relevant “rule” whose “clearly established” nature is at issue).
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instances constitutional overlap from two other types of scenarios in which multiple
constitutional rules might carry shared relevance to the outcome of a constitutional
case. The first scenario is one in which the dictates of one rule incorporate by refer-
ence the dictates of another. Sometimes we need to know whether Rule A has been
violated in order to reach a conclusion about Rule B. To take a trivial example, modern
incorporation doctrine makes clear that a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause whenever it violates almost any provision of the Bill of Rights;28
even so, I do not think it makes sense to say, for instance, that a claim that the state
has violated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination implicates the overlapping
protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.29 In these instances, Rule B does not so much
“overlap” with Rule A as it simply applies because Rule A says it should apply.30
That is, to be sure, an important and consequential form of rights-based interaction.
But the formal incorporation of one right by another strikes me as analytically
distinct from the category of problems that I am here attempting to consider.
The other type of scenario is one in which a claimant must satisfy multiple “sub-
rules” in order to prevail on a particular constitutional claim. Consider, for instance,
a free-speech challenge to an adverse employment action undertaken in response to
a public employee’s expressive conduct. To rule for the challenger, a court must
conclude: (a) that the speech was not made pursuant to that employee’s “official
duties”;31 (b) that the speech was on a “matter of public concern”;32 and (c) that the
employer lacked an “adequate justification” for its actions.33 Under these circum-
stances, it would not make sense to say that the “no official duty,” “public concern,”
and “no adequate justification” requirements overlap with one another, even though
all three requirements could potentially have a bearing on the case’s ultimate out-
come. Rather, it would make more sense to say that each requirement functions as
a necessary element or “component” of a single constitutional right—namely, the
right of a public employee not to face adverse action for certain types of expressive
conduct. What we are zeroing in on, in other words, are only those cases in which
each one of the overlapping rules could on its own provide a plausible justification
for invalidating the same government action, and that of course can never be the
28 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (“With only a handful of exceptions,
this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.” (internal
quotations omitted) (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764–65 (2010))).
29 Cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
30 See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1076 (distinguishing between circumstances in which
multiple rules “carry[ ] decisional weight on account of a definitional linkage to another,” and
those in which “the subject matter of a constitutional issue . . . implicates—independently and
in parallel—multiple constitutional provisions at the same time”).
31 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
32 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983).
33 See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–22.
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case where the relevant doctrinal propositions constitute conjunctive elements of the
underlying right.
These various qualifications should not obscure the overall capaciousness of the
definition we have employed: Instances of constitutional overlap happen a lot. They
happen whenever a challenger attacks the same government action on multiple
(plausible) constitutional grounds, and this is something that claimants frequently
do. What is more: instances of overlap can arise across a varied and unpredictable
set of circumstances—overlap is not a phenomenon exclusive to pairings of substan-
tively similar clauses. The Second Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause
overlap insofar as they both have something to say about laws concerning the in-
terstate transfer of firearms.34 The “just compensation” requirement of Takings Clause
doctrine and the “procedural” component of the Due Process Clause overlap insofar
as they both potentially bear on the validity of various zoning decisions not preceded
by a hearing.35 Eighth Amendment–based proportionality protections overlap with
free-speech protections insofar as governments impose especially punitive prohibi-
tions on expressive conduct.36 Many instances of overlap, to be sure, will feature some
regular and predictable pairs, but others will feature collections of rights that—at
first glance—seem to be substantively quite distinct from one another.
II. FOUR RESPONSES TO CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP
Having defined the phenomenon of constitutional overlap, we will now consider
the different ways in which courts might respond to it. This Part identifies the four
basic strategies that courts employ when reviewing government actions that impli-
cate overlapping constitutional prohibitions: separation, combination, consolidation,
and displacement.
A. Separation
The first and simplest response to an instance of constitutional overlap is to pay it
no heed. Rather than take notice of the fact that the challenged government action si-
multaneously implicates multiple constitutional rules, a court applying the “separation”
34 See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 48–49 (2d
Cir. 2018).
35 See, e.g., Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2012). See generally
D. Zachary Hudson, Note, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280 (2010) (analyz-
ing due-process norms in the context of governmental exercises of the eminent domain power).
36 See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach
to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 999 n.30 (2012); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (speculating, in the substantive due-process
context, that a Georgia anti-sodomy law could give rise to “a serious Eighth Amendment issue”
by permitting judges to sentence the participants in “a single private, consensual act” to a prison
sentence of up to twenty years), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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approach would consider and apply each one of the overlapping rules without refer-
ence to any others. Where a challenger plausibly contends that government action
violates Rule A and also Rule B, a court applying the separation approach would pro-
ceed on the assumption that the action counts as unconstitutional if and only if either
Rule A or Rule B dispositively supports that outcome.37 This approach, in other words,
requires no direct response to the overlap itself; its only operative command is that
the reviewing court apply each rule without reference to the others.
Although I lack quantitative data to this effect, my strong suspicion is that the
separation approach reflects the most common judicial response to instances of con-
stitutional overlap. The approach is on display in the myriad constitutional cases in
which litigants argue about and courts work through the implicated rules sequentially
rather than collectively, and it is reflected in the filings, briefs, and judicial opinions
whose sections and subsections present self-contained analyses of each overlapping
rule. Indeed, the approach is so embedded into the practice of constitutional litiga-
tion that courts and litigants seldom make explicit (much less justify) their choice
to embrace it.38 We can thus characterize separation as the default approach: Unless
otherwise indicated, courts treat the existence of overlap as irrelevant to their analysis
of each overlapping rule. Any other response amounts to a departure from this base-
line norm.39
Two further points about the separation approach are worth highlighting here.
First, the separation approach requires truly independent application of the overlap-
ping rules; not only must a court purport to reach individual conclusions about individ-
ual rules, but the conclusions themselves must not in any way depend on the potential
applicability of any other rule. Clearly, separation would not permit a court to con-
clude that government action violates “Rules A and B acting together,” but it also
would not permit the court to conclude that the action violates “Rule A in light of
Rule B” or “Rule B in light of Rule A.” Nor for that matter would the approach permit
the court to treat the potential applicability of Rule B as “crowding out” or otherwise
precluding a finding of unconstitutionality under Rule A.40 As far as separation is
concerned, these conclusions would each commit the cardinal sin of rendering one
37 “Or” here is meant to be nonexclusive; that is, the alternative grounds approach requires
that at least one of the rules demonstrates unconstitutionality, not that one and only one such
rule does so.
38 See ZICK, supra note 1, at 30.
39 See Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 52 (“This [separation-based] approach is the
norm . . . . Plaintiffs frequently argue constitutional rights violations in the alternative and . . .
courts rarely address the possibility that individually weak claims may be jointly strong.”);
cf. ZICK, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that “courts do not generally discuss rights in explicitly
relational terms”).
40 To be sure, a court applying the separation approach could permissibly conclude that
a definitive finding of unconstitutionality under Rule A obviates the need to evaluate the action’s
constitutionality under Rule B as well. What I have in mind here, rather, is the conclusion that
the fact of overlap operates to prohibit one or more of the overlapping rules from having any
relevance to the outcome of the case. See discussion infra Section II.D.
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rule’s potential applicability relevant to another rule’s application, in effect allowing
the fact of overlap to influence the scope and substance of the underlying inquiry.
The other noteworthy feature of the separation approach has to do with the
precedential effects of the holdings that it generates. Note that on the underlying
logic of the separation approach, a court must analyze all of the overlapping prohibi-
tions in order to justify a conclusion that the challenged action is valid. But the same
is not true for conclusions of constitutional invalidity; the court need only analyze
one such prohibition in order to justify a conclusion that the action violates the law.41
In other words, the separation approach can yield asymmetries as between decisions
that uphold and decisions that invalidate actions within the zone of overlap. Deci-
sions that uphold necessarily will generate “law” that is relevant to all of the over-
lapping rules; decisions that invalidate will not necessarily do the same (and will at
most have alternative holdings on each discrete claim). That is not to say that courts
are strictly prohibited from working through every relevant rule when concluding
that the government has acted unconstitutionally—especially at the lower-court
level, courts often articulate multiple, alternative grounds for concluding that the
government has violated the law. But the separation approach at least affords courts
the opportunity to decline entertaining additional theories of unconstitutionality once
one of the overlapping rules is shown to condemn the action under review.
What is more, even when the separation approach generates holdings about each
overlapping rule, the precedential significance of those holdings is limited in a further
and more subtle respect. Where the reviewing court applies each rule separately, it will
generate nontransferable precedents concerning each of the separately applied rules.
Even where the separation approach permits a court to hold that the government has
violated Rule A and also Rule B, true separation requires that the holding’s rule-
specific precedents remain confined to the rules they purport to address—they can-
not in any way cross paths. Thus, the Rule B aspects of the decision do not generate
any precedent of relevance to Rule A and the Rule A aspects of the decision do not
generate any precedent of relevance to Rule B, and that would remain true even for
some future case in which the rules again turned out to overlap. In short, the separa-
tion approach keeps each overlapping rule confined to its own precedential lane.
B. Combination
Rather than disregard the existence of constitutional overlap, a second response
both takes notice of the overlap’s existence and treats it as a reason to ratchet up
scrutiny of the government action under review. Embracing such a “combination
41 To be clear, this is true only insofar as the overlapping rules articulate prohibitions on
government conduct. If, by contrast, a court was reviewing a claim that Congress lacked the
power under Article I to enact a particular law, the opposite relationship would hold: A conclu-
sion of constitutional invalidity would require consideration of all the overlapping powers
cited in support of the congressional act, whereas a conclusion of constitutional validity would
require consideration of only one such power.
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approach,” courts effectively fuse together the prohibitions associated with the overlap-
ping rules to produce an amplified or “hybridized” set of constitutional limits, limits
that demand more of the government than does each overlapping rule on its own.42
Unlike the separation approach, then, the combination approach rejects the premise
that the government necessarily avoids a constitutional violation by satisfying the
dictates of each applicable rule analyzed separately. Some rules in combination might
suffice to demonstrate a violation that none of them could demonstrate in isolation.
The combination approach received perhaps its most well-known exposition in
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.43 The Court there
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not normally prohibit governments from
imposing “incidental burdens” on religion through the enforcement of “neutral
law[s] of general applicability,”44 while at the same time suggesting that a stricter
approach might apply when the generally applicable law burdens the free-exercise
right alongside some other constitutional freedom(s).45 Put in the parlance of our
framework, Smith thus embraced the idea that in cases where the free exercise right
overlaps with some other right, the normally deferential framework ought to be
jettisoned in favor of a more demanding constitutional inquiry. Smith itself, to be sure,
did not proceed along these lines, given the Court’s (debatable) assumption that the
claimant’s conduct implicated only the free-exercise right.46 But the Court did at
least seem to validate the idea of combination-based reasoning, deeming it appropriate
in at least some circumstances to treat the fact of constitutional overlap as a justifica-
tion for heightened judicial scrutiny.47
Smith’s suggestions about “hybrid rights” in free-exercise cases has not gained
much traction in the lower courts,48 but courts have elsewhere confronted instances
of overlap in an explicitly combination-based manner. The Court itself has held, for
instance, that due-process-based vagueness restrictions should apply with special
force when the government criminalizes expressive conduct,49 thus indicating that
faithful application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires courts to take notice
42 See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 8, at 1075–77.
43 494 U.S. 878 (1990).
44 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
45 Id. at 881–82.
46 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121–22 (1990) (criticizing the majority opinion for not applying its own
“hybrid” rights rule to “Smith itself”).
47 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
48 See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1078–79 & nn.31–32 (highlighting differing lower-court
approaches to Smith’s hybrid-rights language); see also Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at
1328–29 (similar); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 567 (Wash. 2017) (rejecting
a hybrid rights claim on the ground that “the only fundamental right implicated in this case is
the right to religious free exercise”).
49 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974).
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of its overlap with the free-speech right.50 The Court has characterized a right of free
association as deriving from the “close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly.”51 In addition, the Court has recognized a special set of constitutional
limits on criminal court filing fees and other wealth-based restrictions on procedural
rights, reasoning that such restrictions—though not necessarily inconsistent with
either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause in isolation—nonetheless
run afoul of the two clauses’ collective demands.52 The Court has also shown a
willingness to combine different “sub-rules” derived from the same overarching
clause, as it arguably did, for instance, when reasoning in Plyler v. Doe that a Texas
prohibition on public schooling for undocumented children warranted heightened
equal-protection review.53 And the Court twice relied on combination-based logic in
litigation concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage restrictions, with the
50 A related, though somewhat more difficult example involves the “content-discrimination”
principle, which, as originally presented by the Court, was said to derive from an “intersection”
between the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. See R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992) (noting that “[t]his Court itself has occasionally fused the
First Amendment into the Equal Protection Clause in this fashion”); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (“There can be no doubt that in prohibiting peaceful picketing on the pub-
lic streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive
conduct that falls within the First Amendment’s preserve.”); id. at 461–62 (“When government
regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection
Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and
the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.”); Police
Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101–02 (1972); see also id. at 101 (“The Equal Protection
Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their
legitimate objectives.”). At the same time, the Court has more recently presented the content-
discrimination principle as a stand-alone component of Free Speech doctrine, whose force
and vitality does not depend on equal-protection-based non-discrimination rules. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“The First Amendment, applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws ‘abridging
the freedom of speech.’ Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal government
vested with state authority, ‘has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” (internal citations omitted)). If the latter proposition
is true, then applications of the content-discrimination principle would not in fact reflect a
combination-based response to instances of free-speech/equal-protection overlap; rather, and
depending on precisely how they were articulated, such applications would be better charac-
terized as involving either a consolidation of free-speech/equal-protection principles, see dis-
cussion infra Section II.C, or the displacement of an equal-protection rule by a more specifically
applicable free-speech rule, see discussion infra Section II.D.
51 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
52 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996).
53 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“[M]ore is involved in these cases than the abstract question
whether [the Texas law] discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a
fundamental right. [The law] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountable for their disabling status.”); see also Coenen, supra note 8, at 1089–91.
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Justices initially invoking the combined force of federalism-based and rights-based
restrictions as sufficient to warrant invalidation of the federal Defense of Marriage
Act,54 and then subsequently invoking the combined force of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause as sufficient to warrant
invalidation of the states’ own refusals to marry same-sex couples.55 In these and
other ways, the combination-based approach to overlap enjoys a substantial foothold
within modern constitutional doctrine.
Combination analysis is also present when courts point to collections of enumer-
ated rights as justifying recognition of a particular “unenumerated” right.56 The ob-
vious example here is Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
which famously characterized the unenumerated “right to privacy” as emerging from
the “penumbras” and “emanations” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments.57 Whatever one’s view of that conclusion on the merits of that par-
ticular argument, the important thing to notice for our purposes is its unmistakably
combination-based character. The Court in Griswold, to be sure, did not expressly
characterize the right to privacy as a “hybrid right,” nor did it expressly characterize
the cited constitutional provisions as interacting or intersecting with one another in a
combination-like way.58 But the underlying logic that drove the analysis was largely
the same: like Justice Scalia in Smith,59 Justice Douglas in Griswold was treating a
collection of overlapping rules (in this case, the privacy-related provisions of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments) as together sufficient to support an
outcome that none of the rules alone would (apparently) have sufficed to support.60
As the above-mentioned examples help to reveal, combination-based responses
to constitutional overlap need not always take the form of opinions that explicitly
“add together” the prohibitions of multiple rules to produce an amplified hybrid of
the two.61 That is, of course, one way that combination analysis might work: Faced
with government action that implicates both Rule A and also Rule B, the Court might
recognize a new, hybridized “Rule A+B” that applies with greater force. But com-
bination analysis might also assume other forms. For example, if a court highlighted
54 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763–75 (2013).
55 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–05 (2015).
56 See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1098–101 (suggesting that combination arguments can
be understood as a subspecies of structural arguments). Similar arguments have arisen in con-
nection with non-rights-based limits on state power as well. See id. at 1099–100 n.132.
57 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).
58 Id.
59 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
60 See Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 635–36 (2006) (considering Griswold in similar terms).
61 See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1096–98 (suggesting that combination arguments can be
analogized to constitutional-avoidance arguments, in the sense that the potential applicability
of one constitutional right provides a reason to construe another such right in a more pro-
tective manner).
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the potential applicability of Rule B as a reason to ratchet up its scrutiny of govern-
ment action under Rule A (or vice versa), the decision would still derive from an
additive combination of the two prohibitions, even without ever appealing to a
discretely derived “hybrid” right. True, the ultimate holding of the case would take
the form of an opinion “about” Rule A—but the holding would still reflect the critical
feature of according prohibition-strengthening significance to the fact of overlap
itself. Indeed, for our purposes here, we can assume that there is no significant dif-
ference between saying that: (i) Rule A applies more stringently than usual because
the challenged action also implicates Rule B; (ii) Rule B applies more stringently
than usual because the challenged action also implicates Rule A; and (iii) the over-
lapping incidence of Rules A and B should warrant application of a specialized
“Rule A+B” that applies more stringently than does either Rule A or Rule B in
isolation.62 These three conclusions, though formally distinct, all share the critical
feature of pointing to the fact of overlap as a reason to apply a more aggressive form
of constitutional analysis than would apply in the overlap’s absence.
Two final points about combination are worth highlighting here. First, although
the rules generated by the combination approach must yield prohibitions that are in
some sense “greater” than those of its component parts, courts might sometimes rely
on a “combined” rule to generate results that also could have derived from one (or
more) of the component parts on its own.63 From the fact that Rule A+B applies
more severely than does either Rule A or B, it does not follow that all violations of
Rule A+B are necessarily non-violations of Rule A and also of Rule B. Some
government actions that violate Rule A+B will also violate Rule A and/or Rule B
as well, and we cannot therefore assume that any government action condemned by
the combination-based rule would necessarily pass muster under any (or all) of the
rule’s component parts. To be sure, a particular combination-based holding could
expressly acknowledge that the combination of Rules A and B was in fact necessary
(and not just sufficient) to support a conclusion of constitutional invalidity, in which
case we would be justified in assuming that substantially similar government actions
would not violate Rule A or B in isolation. But the court can also treat a demon-
strated violation of Rule A+B as obviating the need to consider whether a stand-alone
violation of Rule A or Rule B has also occurred.64 Courts, that is, can sometimes
utilize combination for issue-avoidance purposes: a court can “narrowly” decide a
62 Indeed, there is a sense in which all three of these holdings—and not just the third—
result in a new, hybridized “Rule A+B.” True, the first two holdings are situated within the
doctrines of Rule A and Rule B, respectively, but each such holding carves out a specialized
subspace in which each such doctrine applies more forcefully in light of the other rule’s
potential applicability. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 1344 n.174 (noting that the
“intersectional analysis” of multiple rights results in the “creation of an entirely new consti-
tutional standard, whether that standard is located in one or more constitutional clauses”).
63 See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 8, at 1078–80.
64 See, e.g., id. at 1107–08.
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case by reference to the combined effect of Rules A and B and thus steer clear of
broader questions about Rules A and B themselves.65
Second, and relatedly, combination-based holdings can carry precedential in-
fluence even outside the zone of overlap to which those holdings apply. To take one
example, a combination-based application of “First Amendment vagueness principles”
will most directly bear on future “First Amendment vagueness” cases, but it might
also exert some (albeit lesser) precedential force in cases outside the overlap—i.e.,
void-for-vagueness cases not involving free-speech issues (and/or free-speech cases
not involving void-for-vagueness issues).66 In such cases, to be sure, the significance
of the holding must be to some degree “discounted” in light of that holding’s
combination-based character: that the prior case itself involved overlapping rights
might well qualify as a basis for distinguishing away a present-day case that does
not.67 But at the same time, a combination-based holding could still end up saying
things about each of the combined rules that would apply with equal force outside
the zone of overlap (e.g., “the severe criminal penalties attached to this statute only
heighten our concerns about the vagueness of its prohibitions”), and a combination-
based holding might sometimes provide a fortiori support for a non-combination
holding involving only one of the overlapping rules (e.g., “given that we have
upheld similarly vague statutes even where they implicate the free-speech right, this
statute—which implicates no free-speech concerns—obviously poses no void-for-
vagueness problems”). All of which is simply to say that the present-day application
of Rule A+B will contribute “law” not just to the fledgling, overlap-specific doctrine
associated with “Rule A+B,” but also (albeit less clearly) to the more established set
of doctrines associated with Rule A in isolation and Rule B in isolation.
C. Consolidation
A third approach to constitutional overlap shares with the combination approach
its willingness to merge multiple rules into one. But in contrast to the combination
approach, which regards the existence of overlap as a reason to ratchet up constitu-
tional scrutiny, this consolidation-based approach treats the overlap as an invitation
to eliminate unwanted redundancy. Rather than add the overlapping rules together,
the consolidation approach looks to subtract repetitive analyses away, thus permit-
ting courts to dispose of multiple constitutional claims by applying a single, all-
consuming rule. Put differently, whereas the combination approach might be seen as
building a new and more robust rule out of two component parts, the consolidation
approach can instead be seen as eliding those parts to form a single, but substantively
65 See id. at 1104–06.
66 See id. at 1081.
67 See id. at 1121–22 (noting that “courts should take care to acknowledge the combination-
based nature of the holdings they invoke and to explain why those holdings should continue
to carry force in the absence of an analogous multiple clause situation”).
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identical, rule. Faced with a potentially applicable Rule A and another potentially
applicable Rule B, courts apply in their stead not a combined, Rule A+B, said to
derive from the two rules’ cumulative effect, but rather a consolidated “Rule A|B,”
a rule whose analytical framework does not in any way differ from what either Rule
A or Rule B would provide for on its own. Multiple rule-specific inquiries thus
converge to yield a single such inquiry that captures singlehandedly what each rule
would otherwise redundantly prescribe.
The consolidation approach is nicely illustrated by the Tenth Circuit’s opinion
in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver.68 Colorado forbade “pervasively sec-
tarian” educational institutions from participating in the state’s “tuition assistance
program,” and a school challenged the law as violating the overlapping dictates of
the Equal Protection, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses.69 The district court
analyzed the claims sequentially, and, finding no violation under any of the three
clauses, proceeded to uphold the exclusion and dismiss the case.70 On appeal, and
in an opinion by then-Judge Michael McConnell, the Tenth Circuit took a different
approach: Noting that the three clause-specific claims “draw on . . . common princi-
ples,”71 the court chose not to proceed through each claim on its own, clause-specific
terms.72 Instead, the court interchangeably invoked Establishment Clause precedents,
equal-protection precedents, and free-exercise precedents in support of its conclu-
sion that the law failed to honor a basic component of “religious liberty”—namely,
68 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
69 At the district court, the institution argued that the exclusion violated the Free Exercise
Clause by unjustifiably subjecting religious institutions to a distinctly non-neutral set of bur-
dens, that it violated the Establishment Clause by “establishing a State preference for funding
schools that are ‘sectarian’ but not ‘pervasively’ so,” and that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause by “treat[ing] similarly situated individuals or entities differently with respect to their
religious beliefs.” Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and for Declar-
atory and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 27, 29, Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 2006 WL
2255900 (D. Colo. 2006) (No. 04-RB-2512), 2005 WL 3157140.
70 Interestingly, the district court did refer back to its Establishment Clause analysis in
separately rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection claim. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Baker,
2007 WL 1489801, at *12 (D. Colo. May 18, 2007) (noting that the “preceding Establishment
Clause analysis applies with equal force to [the] Equal Protection claim”). In that sense, then,
the district court might at least be said to have consolidated its establishment-based and equal-
protection-based inquiries.
71 Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1258.
72 See id. at 1257–58. For a similar approach to a similar collection of claims, see Olsen v.
DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1459, 1463 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (considering a claim of
religious discrimination under an “establishment clause–equal protection rubric” while noting
that, “in cases of this character, establishment clause and equal protection analyses converge”);
cf. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that plaintiffs had
brought Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims “under the theory that the First Amend-
ment demands strict governmental neutrality among religious sects” and consolidating the
claims for purposes of rejecting arguments that the city had asserted on a motion to dismiss).
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the requirement that governments provide “equal treatment of all religious faiths
without discrimination or preference.”73
At first glance, Colorado Christian University (CCU ) might be mistaken for a
straightforward example of the combination approach: the court, after all, started
with three “building-block” rules and finished with a single “super-rule” attributable
to all three of the building blocks. But in fact, the opinion was doing something
different, as the court in CCU itself made clear. Rather than attribute its religious
discrimination analysis to the cumulative impact of the three rules working together,
the court described its analysis as simultaneously capturing each one of those rules’
individual commands.74 Neither the underlying analysis nor the bottom-line conclu-
sion would have changed in the event that only one or even two of the three rules
had been invoked by the plaintiff.75 And that was so because, as applied to religiously
discriminatory government action, the three rules merely reflected different ways of
saying the same thing: namely, that religiously discriminatory action could pass
muster only if it satisfied heightened means/ends scrutiny.76 Thus, having extracted
a single, shared instruction from each of the three overlapping rules, the court found
a way to apply them all together in a single fell swoop.77
73 Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257–58; see also id. at 1258 (“[W]hile the Establish-
ment Clause frames much of our inquiry, the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and
Equal Protection Clause proceed along similar lines.”); id. at 1266 (“From this we conclude
that statutes involving discrimination on the basis of religion, including interdenominational
discrimination, are subject to heightened scrutiny whether they arise under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause.” (citations omitted)).
Complicating matters somewhat, the Tenth Circuit did consider an alternative theory of un-
constitutionality beyond the baseline claim of religious discrimination. This theory, which was
based squarely on Establishment Clause limits on government entanglement, was considered
separately from the consolidated set of religious-discrimination claims. See id. at 1261–66.
Thus, viewed as a whole, the CCU opinion can be understood as applying: (1) a consolidated,
“non-discrimination” rule attributed to the overlapping protections of the Free Exercise, Es-
tablishment, and Equal Protection Clauses; and (2) a separately applicable “anti-endorsement”
rule, attributed exclusively to the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1266–67.
74 See id. at 1257–58.
75 See id. at 1257 (noting that “[t]he Court has called neutral treatment of religions ‘[t]he
clearest command of the Establishment Clause,’” that “[s]uch discrimination is forbidden by
the Free Exercise Clause as well,” and that “[t]he Court has suggested that the Equal Protection
Clause’s requirement is parallel” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1266 (holding that “statutes
involving discrimination on the basis of religion, including interdenominational discrimination,
are subject to heightened scrutiny whether they arise under the Free Exercise Clause, the Es-
tablishment Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause” (citations omitted) (emphasis added))
(quoted in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2441 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
76 See id. at 1266.
77 The court did acknowledge some “uncertainty about the level of scrutiny,” owing to
some unclear language from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Locke v. Davey. Id. at 1267 (dis-
cussing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004)). But it ultimately sidestepped the issue
by noting that “the State scarcely has any justification at all.” Id. In other words, the Court
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The Supreme Court has also made use of the consolidation approach. In Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, for instance, the Justices considered a set of overlapping
claims concerning a public law school’s requirement that registered student organi-
zations not restrict membership on the basis of a student’s “status or beliefs.”78 The
challengers to this “all-comers” policy contended that it violated two different con-
stitutional rights: it abridged the right to “free speech,” by restricting the messages
that organizations could express with their membership criteria,79 and it also abridged
the right to “expressive association,” by restricting students’ ability to assemble with
like-minded peers.80 But rather than “engage each line of cases independently,” the
majority instead opted not “to treat CLS’s speech and association claims as dis-
crete.”81 The better approach, it reasoned, was to recognize that “[t]he same ground
rules . . . govern both speech and association challenges in the limited-public-forum
context.”82 And applying that approach, the Court thus reached the conclusion that
its own “limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework for as-
sessing both CLS’s speech and association rights.”83 Thus, much as the Tenth Circuit
managed to consolidate three ostensibly separate religious discrimination claims by
applying a single iteration of heightened means/ends scrutiny, the Court in Christian
Legal Society managed to resolve two, ostensibly separate expression-related claims
by applying a single iteration of the limited public forum test.
For one final example of consolidation in action, consider the not-uncommon
scenario in which government action, though neither discriminatory on the basis of
a suspect classification nor an abridgement of a “fundamental right,” is alleged to
violate both equal protection and substantive due process. Under these circumstances,
the overlapping rules each call for application of rational basis review, with both
doctrines purporting to permit the challenged action as long as it relates rationally
to a legitimate government interest.84 That redundancy invites consolidation; rather
than apply the same rational basis test twice, asking first whether the government
made clear that the challengers would have won even in the event that the consolidated con-
stitutional analysis required something less than a “compelling” governmental interest. Id.
78 561 U.S. 661, 671 (2010). I am grateful to Professor Zick for bringing this example to
my attention.
79 Id. at 668.




84 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (noting for substantive-due-process
purposes that “[t]he impairment of a lesser [i.e., non-fundamental] interest . . . demands no
more than a ‘reasonable fit’ between governmental purpose . . . and the means chosen to ad-
vance that purpose”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (“[A] classification neither
involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presump-
tion of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there
is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose.” (citations omitted)).
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action’s equality-reducing elements are rationally related to a legitimate interest and
then again whether its liberty-reducing elements are also so related, courts can instead
just ask once whether the government has a rational basis for what it has done,
applying a consolidated “rational basis” test as a substitute for the two separate (but
functionally equivalent) tests that would otherwise apply.85 There again, then, one
single inquiry suffices to resolve two different rights-based claims—not because the
claims fuse together to form a more potent basis for constitutional attack, but rather
because the claims are understood as requiring indistinguishable doctrinal inquiries.
As these examples help to reveal, consolidation works only to the extent that the
overlapping rules really are coextensive with one another. A consolidated version
of Rules A and B cannot operate as a reliable substitute for both Rule A and Rule
B unless Rules A and B themselves each call for the same analysis; otherwise, the
consolidated inquiry will not always reflect what each of the two rules prescribe.
Consolidation would not have worked in Colorado Christian University if the court
had first determined that the applicable free-exercise limits on religious discrimina-
tion were more exacting than the limits imposed by the other two clauses; had that
been so, any attempt at a consolidated test would have sometimes misfired, occa-
sionally yielding constitutional conclusions that at least one of its underlying clauses
did not in fact support.86 Nor would consolidation have worked in Martinez if the
Court had concluded that the free-association claim warranted higher scrutiny than the
free-speech claim. And, to revisit our final example, courts cannot “consolidate” equal-
protection and substantive due-process limits on government action where those
limits call for different standards of means/ends scrutiny; there is no shared substi-
tute, for instance, that is capable of simultaneously mirroring rational basis review and
the intermediate scrutiny test. In sum, when two or more overlapping rules require
functionally different constitutional analyses, courts will be unable to identify a shared,
common analysis that adequately substitutes for each one of the overlapping rules.87
85 See, e.g., Newman v. Consol. Dispatch Agency, 737 F. App’x 956, 958–59 (11th Cir.
2018) (“Where no fundamental rights are involved, the test is essentially the same for both
equal protection and substantive due process analysis.”); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208,
1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause a substantive due process analysis proceeds along the same
lines as an equal protection analysis, our equal protection discussion sufficiently addresses
both claims.”); Lockary v. Kavfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Scrutiny under
equal protection analysis is essentially equivalent to scrutiny under due process doctrine.”);
cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755 n.3 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The doc-
tors also rely on the Equal Protection Clause, but that source of law does essentially nothing
in a case like this that the Due Process Clause cannot do on its own.”).
86 To be sure, a court could jointly attribute a single, elevated inquiry to a set of overlapping
rules, but the court would then be combining rather than consolidating the rules.
87 Consolidation thus differs in an important respect from the practice of doctrinal bor-
rowing, whereby courts “import[ ] doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from
one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive ends.” Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 5,
at 461. Borrowing might suffice to create similarities across two different areas of doctrine, but
the similarities do not in and of themselves achieve the sort of consolidation I am describing
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This final point carries important implications for the precedential significance
of a consolidation-based holding. Recall our earlier observations about the uncertain
precedential relationships that exist between a combination-based application of two
rules and the law associated with each individual rule: Any opinion concerning the
application of a hybridized “Rule A+B” will have a contingent, context-specific bear-
ing on subsequent cases involving only Rule A or only Rule B.88 The precedential
implications of a consolidation-based decision should in fact be more straightfor-
ward. Unlike a combined “Rule A+B,” which purports to do something more than
its constituent parts, a consolidated “Rule A|B” purports to do precisely what its
constituent parts would in any event do. That being so, all future applications of
“Rule A|B” should be fully attributable to the “law” of Rule A and the “law” of Rule
B, just as all future applications of Rule A and of Rule B should be fully attributable
to the law of “Rule A|B.” Beyond that, a decision to consolidate Rules A and B
might also have the effect of rendering past applications of Rule A automatically
relevant to the “law” of Rule B, and vice versa. Consolidation thus ought to give rise
to a sort of “precedential interoperability” within the zone of overlap; once the
overlapping rules are said to provide for one and the same test, then everything of
relevance to one rule ought to be of immediate relevance to the other rule as well.
D. Displacement
Like the combination and consolidation approaches, the final approach to consti-
tutional overlap begins with a collection of overlapping rules and concludes with a
single applicable inquiry. But this “displacement” approach does not achieve that result
through any explicit intermingling of the overlapping rules. Rather, the reviewing court
simply identifies one and only one of these rules as providing the exclusive avenue
of constitutional inquiry. Thus, given some form of government action that plausibly
implicates the protections of Rule A and also of Rule B, this approach might simply
dictate that Rule A “occupies the field” and that Rule B should therefore be ignored.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor offers the clearest example
of this “displacement” approach in action.89 The case stemmed from police officers’ use
of violence while conducting an arrest—government action that, under the law at the
time, plausibly implicated both (1) Fourth Amendment–based reasonableness limits
on arrests made with “excessive force”;90 and (2) Fourteenth Amendment–based
substantive due-process protections of bodily autonomy.91 The Court could have
here. Rather, consolidation would occur only after a court, recognizing that two overlapping
rules provide for the same essential analysis, simply dictates that a single application of that
shared analysis will govern the disposition of both rules.
88 See supra notes 43–55 and accompanying text.
89 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
90 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
91 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952). Technically speaking, of course,
both limits stemmed from the Due Process Clause: the “Fourth-Amendment-based” claim
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responded to this overlap by treating the two “rules” as alternative grounds for relief,
asking first whether the officers’ conduct amounted to an unreasonable seizure under
excessive force doctrine and next whether the officers’ conduct violated substantive
due process. Or, following the combination approach, the Court might have resolved
the case by reference to an elevated set of safeguards said to arise from the combined
interaction of the overlapping constitutional protections against violent police behavior.
Or, following the consolidation approach, the Court could have treated the two protec-
tions as coextensive within the zone of overlap, applying a single constitutional test
said to effectuate both guarantees simultaneously. But the Court did none of those
things. Rather, it simply stipulated that “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intru-
sive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”92 Or, as
Justice Blackmun would put it in a separate opinion, the majority made clear that
“prearrest excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
rather than under a substantive-due-process standard.”93 Thus, without even reach-
ing the merits of the substantive-due-process claim, the Court simply waved it away,
concluding that the Fourth Amendment safeguard had crowded out its substantive-
due-process counterpart.94
Though ostensibly a case about arrest-related use-of-force claims, Graham has
been understood to require displacement in other substantive contexts as well. The Su-
preme Court itself has attributed to Graham a “more-specific-provision” rule,95
according to which “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional pro-
vision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under
the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive
due process.”96 And various lower courts have relied on this rule to hold, among
stemmed from that portion of the Due Process Clause that “incorporated” the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections against the states, and the “substantive-due-process” claim derived from
the residual portion of the Fourteenth Amendment that conferred some further set of “unenu-
merated” rights against the states. Id. at 168–69.
92 Id. at 395.
93 Id. at 399–400 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment and in part). But see Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1998) (treating a substantive-due-process chal-
lenge to police conduct as not barred by Graham, given that the conduct at issue did not “amount
to a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” and that the case was therefore
not “covered by” the Fourth Amendment).
94 Notably, the Court in Graham also went on to suggest that claimants could not rely on
substantive due process in challenging postarrest uses of force against “convicted prisoners,”
treating such claims as displaced by the Eighth Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395
n.10 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (“Any protection that ‘substantive
due process’ affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best redun-
dant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.”)).
95 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833.
96 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510
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other things, that the Takings Clause displaces the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses as applied to various types of land-use decisions,97 that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel displaces the due-process right as applied to claims involving
the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases,98 that the Eighth Amendment’s
right against cruel and unusual punishment displaces substantive-due-process rights
in cases challenging the actions of prison administrators,99 and so forth.100
The displacement required by the more-specific-provision rule is the product of a
direct, explicit instruction concerning the proper approach to a particular type of over-
lap. But displacement-like results might also be achieved indirectly as well. Specifi-
cally, courts might simply define two constitutional rules in such a way that ensures,
within the zone of overlap, that any violation of one rule would automatically constitute
a violation of the other (but not necessarily vice versa). In other words, rather than
mandate that courts apply Rule A and not Rule B, a court might instead simply
render the two rules “partially redundant” with one another, such that the protections
established by Rule B were “all-encompassed” or “subsumed” by the protections
established by Rule A.101 Though formally different from a displacement-requiring
U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (contending that claims of prosecution without probable cause are to be
evaluated exclusively by reference to the Fourth Amendment and not substantive due process).
97 See Bateman v. City of W. Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiff’s “due process and equal protection claims are subsumed within the more par-
ticularized protections of the Takings Clause” (internal quotations, citations and alterations
omitted)); Miller v. Campbell Cty., 945 F.2d 348, 352 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Because the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes very specific obligations upon the
government when it seeks to take private property, we are reluctant in the context of a factual
situation that falls squarely within that clause to impose new and potentially inconsistent
obligations upon the parties under the substantive or procedural components of the Due
Process Clause. It is appropriate in this case to subsume the more generalized Fourteenth
Amendment due process protections within the more particularized protections of the Just
Compensation Clause.”).
98 United States v. Hernandez, 333 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003) (declining to con-
sider a Fifth Amendment–based due-process claim related to government interference with
a criminal defendant’s attorney-client relationship on the ground that the claim was cognizable
only by reference to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
99 See, e.g., Beahm v. Burke, 982 F. Supp. 2d 451, 460–61 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (noting that
“[w]ith regard to her substantive due process claim, the defendants assert that because of the
‘more specific provision rule,’ the plaintiff can only make out a claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment for the assertion that the plaintiff was released past her scheduled release date” and
expressing “agree[ment] with the defendants that [the court is] bound by the ‘more specific
provision rule’ and must analyze the plaintiff’s claim under the Eighth Amendment, not the
substantive due process rubric”).
100 See, e.g., People v. Uribe, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 125–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (noting
that because a prosecutor’s “misconduct . . . related to defendant’s procedural due process
rights . . . defendant is precluded under the more-specific-provision rule from asserting a
substantive due process claim”).
101 See Bateman, 89 F.3d at 709; Miller, 945 F.2d at 352.
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decision, any such recognition of partial redundancy would likely end up generating
a functionally similar set of results.
Why would partial redundancy yield displacement-like effects? The answer is
that, once Rule B becomes logically subsumed by Rule A, then Rule B becomes
irrelevant to (and Rule A always dispositive of) the constitutional analysis of actions
that implicate both of the two rules at once. Under such circumstances, one of two
things can be true: (1) the action violates Rule A, in which case it is unconstitu-
tional; or (2) the action does not violate Rule A, in which case, by definition, the
action does not violate Rule B either. For any government action that simultaneously
implicates Rules A and B, the court can thus reach a definitive conclusion as to that
action’s validity by simply applying Rule A and Rule A alone. The substantive
relationship between the two rules thus gives the Court every reason to apply Rule
A and to ignore Rule B—thus, in effect, displacing the latter with the former.
The point of this comparison is not to insist that the Court would officially man-
date displacement by making the presence of one constitutional violation depend on
the presence of another. Technically speaking, such a decision would remain compati-
ble with a separation-based approach to constitutional overlap, leaving future courts
free to continue applying the “effectively displaced” Rule B even when it is no longer
necessary to do so. But when viewed through a more functionalist lens, the creation
or recognition of partially redundant rules would operate much like a decision that
explicitly mandates the elevation of one rule and the displacement the other.
That point leads me to a final observation about displacement and partial re-
dundancy: Just as it might sometimes be useful to think of formally substantive
decisions in displacement-like terms, so too might it sometimes be useful to think
of formally displacement-like decisions in substantive terms. We have shown, after
all, that courts can achieve something similar to displacement by creating a sort of
“partial” redundancy across two rules: a decision that predicates a violation of Rule
B on a separate violation of Rule A (but not necessarily vice versa) may effectively
render Rule B irrelevant to the future resolution of cases within the zone of overlap.
But if that is true, then what does it tell us about the substantive implications of a
decision like Graham? One answer to that question might be nothing. Perhaps the
displacement-based holding of Graham reflects nothing more than a “procedural”
instruction about the appropriateness of adjudicating substantive-due-process claims
in arrest-related cases—a holding that says nothing about what substantive-due-process
doctrine does and does not allow. But another answer might be that Graham establishes
the same sort of partial redundancy that other cases might make explicit: One could,
in other words, understand Graham’s displacement rule as codifying the conclusion
that substantive due process prohibits only those arrests that the Fourth Amendment
already prohibits, and that it is therefore never possible for an arresting officer to
violate substantive due process without also violating the Fourth Amendment.102 So
102 Some commentators have understood Graham in such terms. See, e.g., Jill I. Brown,
Comment, Defining “Reasonable” Police Conduct: Graham v. Connor, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1257,
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understood, the displacement approach would end up linking the content of the two
rules in a substantively significant way.
***
The next part of this Essay will begin to consider how courts ought to choose
between the four responses to overlap that the foregoing analysis has identified. But
before we turn to that issue, let me offer a more concise summary of the four re-
sponses themselves.
Specifically, in the event that government action “X” is plausibly alleged to
violate Rule A and also Rule B, a reviewing court might plausibly respond in one
of four ways:
(1) Separation: X is unconstitutional if and only if X violates Rule A or
Rule B. It is possible that X could violate both Rule A and Rule B, or
one, or the other, or neither, but the fact of overlap itself is irrelevant to
the analysis of each claim.
(2) Combination: X is unconstitutional if it violates Rule A or Rule B, but X
may also be unconstitutional even if it does not violate Rule A or Rule
B. In particular, X might also violate a combination of the two rules (call
it “Rule A+B”) even if it violates neither Rule A nor Rule B in isolation.
(3) Consolidation: X is unconstitutional if and only if X violates Rule A or
Rule B, but because those rules are coextensive within the zone of overlap,
it will never be possible for X to violate Rule A without violating Rule B,
and vice versa. Thus, we can streamline our analysis by simply applying
the single form of analysis that Rules A and B each independently pre-
scribe (call it ‘Rule A|B’) and asking whether that analysis condemns
the action under review.
(4) Displacement: X is unconstitutional if and only if it violates Rule A. X
may also violate Rule B, but that question is immaterial to our analysis,
because the outcome of this case should depend exclusively on the
application of Rule A.103
1286 (1991) (“By designating the fourth amendment as the exclusive source of constitutional
protection against excessive force during arrest, Graham brings potential clarity to a confused
area of section 1983 litigation. Because the fourth amendment specifically applies to seizures
of persons, substantive due process analysis is at best redundant in this context.”). Interestingly,
the Court in Graham appeared to draw an explicit linkage between redundancy and displace-
ment when alluding to the possibility that the Eighth Amendment might also displace postarrest
substantive-due-process claims. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“Any
protection that ‘substantive due process’ affords convicted prisoners against excessive force
is, we have held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.”).
103 These descriptions all envision instances in which precisely two rules overlap. But as
more rules enter the picture, additional possibilities can emerge. For instance, if X is plausibly
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III. CHOOSING THE RIGHT RESPONSE
So, how should courts respond to instances of constitutional overlap? Not sur-
prisingly, I lack a simple answer to this question. The problem is variegated and
complex, and I doubt there exists a tidy formula for identifying the objectively
correct way of dealing with each and every collection of overlapping rights-based
rules. That is especially so given that the choice among different responses often
implicates difficult substantive judgments about each of the overlapping rights: one
cannot disentangle the question of how two rules ought to interrelate from the
question of what each of those rules ought respectively to provide; thus, disagree-
ment about the content of individual rules can bleed into disagreement about the
appropriate means of navigating their overlapping territory. In short, reasonable
minds can and often will disagree about the rightness or wrongness of separating,
combining, consolidating, or displacing within a given case; the best we can do is
to try and make clear the sorts of considerations and value judgments that ought to
figure into this choice.
A. Separation
We’ll begin with the separation approach. As we have already seen, courts rarely
pause to justify, let alone acknowledge, the assumption that two or more overlapping
rules should operate as separate and independent bases for constitutional relief. As
a descriptive matter, separation thus tends to prevail over its competing approaches
by default; unless anyone puts an alternative approach on the table, courts will
respond to constitutional overlap in a separation-based manner.
But even if separation does operate as the default approach to constitutional over-
lap, the question remains as to whether it ought in fact to do so. And on this issue,
I will confess to some ambivalence. On the one hand, instances of constitutional
overlap generally require more analysis and deliberation than courts typically accord
alleged to violate Rule A, Rule B, and Rule C, a reviewing court might choose to combine
Rules A and B and then to treat Rule A+B and Rule C as alternative grounds for decision. But
a court might also choose to combine all three rules, allowing for the possibility that X is un-
constitutional if it violates Rule A+B+C. Or, a court might decide that Rule B is displaced by
Rule A, but not Rule C, thus treating the question of constitutionality as dependent on the ques-
tion whether X violates Rule A or Rule C. Or, a court might decide that Rule A+B is equivalent
to Rule C and consolidate accordingly (applying, in effect, a Rule (A+B)|C). In sum, when more
than two rules enter the picture, the baseline responses to constitutional overlap can them-
selves mix and match to yield additional, more complex possibilities. I lack the time and space
to canvass exhaustively the myriad ways in which four “baseline” responses to overlap might
function as the building blocks for a more complex set of approaches. Instead, I will confine the
remainder of my analysis to the simplest instances of overlap—i.e., those in which only two
rules bear on the constitutionality of the government action under review. The hope is that
by clarifying the nature of the choice where n = 2, we can provide some basis for thinking
through the more complex set of options that present themselves when n > 2.
374 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:347
to them, and I would thus disfavor any rule that permitted application of any ap-
proach by reference to the existing (and to my mind unsatisfying) status quo. Put
another way, if applying the separation approach requires no affirmative argument
in its favor, then courts are more likely to continue applying that approach without
thinking seriously about the relative merits of its alternatives.
On the other hand, separation’s “default” status does make sense insofar as the
best reasons to pursue separation can very often be restated as reasons not to pursue
combination, consolidation, and/or displacement. Given that separation reflects
something of a “non-response” to constitutional overlap—a means of effectively
ignoring the overlapping incidence of multiple, rights-based claims—the simplest
and most straightforward means of evaluating separation’s appropriateness may well
boil down to a process of eliminating its three competing alternatives: If a court
cannot identify a good reason for pursuing combination, consolidation, or displace-
ment, then that fact in itself might militate in favor of pursuing separation instead.
Indeed, I am hard pressed to identify any special reasons for embracing separation
that does not itself involve the comparative disadvantages of some other approach.
Separation might sometimes make sense, for instance, when combination would
create too much doctrinal complexity. Separation might sometimes make sense where
the overlapping rules lack the sort of substantive redundancy that would otherwise
justify consolidation. And so forth. The best arguments in favor of the separation
approach very often turn out to be arguments against one or more of its alternatives.
Overall, then, there is something to be said for treating separation as the “de-
fault” approach to constitutional overlap. But by that I do not mean to characterize
separation as an approach that courts should unthinkingly embrace. A default rule
need not function as a rule that demands (or even permits) reflexive adherence; it
can just as easily operate as a rule that requires careful thinking about the non-
default options before the default is utilized. And because separation’s appropriate-
ness can often be defended by reference to the inappropriateness of its alternatives,
I think courts have good reason to accord it default status.
B. Combination
I have elsewhere addressed at length the “to combine or not to combine”
question,104 and I will not rehash the entirety of my prior arguments and conclusions.
What I will say here is that the question can usefully be understood to depend on
two different sets of judgments: (1) interpretive judgments about the specific pairing
of rules whose combinability is at issue; and (2) a broader set of pragmatic judg-
ments about the system-wide effects of increasing the presence of combination
analysis within the law.
As to the first set of judgments, we can imagine various reasons why different
collections of rules might or might not invite a combination-based fusion of their
104 See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1101–20.
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protections. One especially salient feature, in my view, involves the rules’ relative
specificity: If Rules A and B each articulate highly particularized, crisply defined,
and mechanically applicable protections across a wide range of cases, then any
recognition of an amplified, Rule A+B would risk running contrary to the detailed
stipulations of each component part.105 By contrast, when either Rule A or Rule B
articulates open-ended and indeterminate, subsequent clarifications of its uncertain
scope might plausibly draw insight from other, overlapping rules.106 And that might
be especially so where the relevant rules resonate with and relate to one another in
a salient manner. (Recall, for instance, Justice Kennedy’s suggestion in Obergefell
that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses had a “synergy” and were “con-
nected in a profound way.”107) To be sure, combination’s appropriateness need not
always depend on the existence of such a clearly identifiable “synergy”; some rules
might warrant combination even where they lack a “profound” connection between
themselves.108 But thematic or substantive resonance might at least be said to strengthen
the case for combining two rules.
Other interpretive considerations might also apply across broader categories of
rules. I have previously suggested, for instance, that the rule of construction outlined
in the Ninth Amendment lends an extra degree of textual legitimacy to the combination
of rights-based requirements derived from the Bill of Rights.109 We might have fewer
scruples about combining two sub-rules that derive from a single constitutional clause
than we would about combining two different clauses from two different parts of the
105 See id. at 1109–12.
106 See id. at 1115–16.
107 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–05 (2015); see also Abrams & Garrett,
supra note 8, at 1349–53 (highlighting other areas in which pairings of rules substantively
intersect in revealing and informative ways).
108 To some extent, the answer to this question boils down to whether one adopts what
Professor Hellman has characterized as an “additive” view of combination-based reasoning,
as compared to an alternative, “synergistic”-based view. See Deborah Hellman, The Epistemic
Function of Fusing Equal Protection and Due Process, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 383,
386–90. On an additive view, combination’s permissibility would not depend on the exis-
tence of salient thematic connections between the constituent rules; it would be enough for
a court to infer from the fact that each rule “partially” prohibits the government action under
review the further fact that the two rules together prohibit that action in full. See Coenen,
supra note 8, at 1092. But see id. at 1122–25 (contending that courts should not combine rules
when doing so would have the effect of “double-counting” values and considerations that are
already baked into at least one of the rule’s substantive protections). On a synergistic view,
by contrast, combination’s permissibility would depend on whether the two clauses “interrelate”
in a particular manner. See Hellman, supra, at 386; see also Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8,
at 1330–43. Professor Hellman herself proposes a third, “epistemic” conception of combination-
based reasoning, according to which multiple rights-based rules each help to “guide us as to
the meaning of the other.” See Hellman, supra, at 392. Insofar as this is the operative conception
of combination-based reasoning, then the permissibility of the combination approach would
depend on the extent to which each constituent rule helps to elucidate the other rule’s meaning.
109 See Coenen, supra note 8, at 1111.
376 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:347
document.110 Relatedly, we might be more willing to combine rules derived from the
Bill of Rights when they apply against the states, on the theory that, as applied
against the states, the rules actually all derive from the same, Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.111 And beyond all of that, there may sometimes arise
potential concerns about distortion and double-counting; it might not make sense,
for instance, to combine Rule A with Rule B when Rule A already furthers the values
associated with Rule B; and it certainly would not make sense to “recombine” Rule
A with an already-combined Rule A+B, the latter of which already purports to
implement and effectuate Rule A’s individual protections.
As for the pragmatic considerations, I have highlighted several in my previous
work, but the primary concern goes to doctrinal complexity.112 Combination, by
definition, injects more rules and categories into operative constitutional doctrine,
leaving courts and litigants with more questions to argue about (and eventually re-
solve) in future constitutional cases. Increases in doctrinal complexity may be tolerable
to some extent, but too many combinations of too many rules could start to pose a
problem for the efficient, predictable, and consistent resolution of cases over time.
That is especially so when zones of constitutional overlap involve more than just
two potentially applicable rules, some of which might themselves be a product of
earlier combination-based decisions. Courts might therefore sensibly decline to
combine two rules even where the pairing of rules in isolation might seem to invite
it; the broader doctrinal environment itself might no longer be able to accommodate the
additional doctrinal tests, frameworks, and categories to which additional combination-
based decisions would give rise.
C. Consolidation
We have already seen that the decision whether to consolidate Rules A and B
reflects and operationalizes a judgment that the rules are “totally redundant” (i.e., that
everything prohibited by Rule A is also prohibited by Rule B and everything pro-
hibited by Rule B is also prohibited by Rule A.) In some cases, then, the question
whether to consolidate should be easily resolvable. If the overlapping rules diverge in
scope and substance, then the overlapping rules should not—indeed, really cannot—be
consolidated. (For example, the dormant Commerce Clause and the Second Amend-
ment might sometimes overlap in cases involving state-law prohibitions on interstate
gun sales, but there is not much of a “shared substance” to be jointly extracted from and
110 Cf. id. at 1089.
111 See id. at 1111 (“Many right/right combination arguments, moreover, involve provisions
of the Bill of Rights that apply against the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Does combining one incorporated element of a Clause with another such element
create any obvious tension with the singular nature of the Clause itself?”).
112 See id. at 1109–16 (canvassing various practical problems associated with the prolifera-
tion of combination analysis).
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attributed to these two rules across a broader category of cases.113) By the same token,
if the overlapping rules are identical in scope and substance, then the case for consoli-
dation becomes considerably more compelling.114 (To the extent that equal-protection
113 In a technical sense, this is not necessarily true. Imagine, for instance, the following
scenario: In an initial case, the court holds that the government action X violates neither the
dormant Commerce Clause nor the Second Amendment. In a later case, the government con-
fronts a government action Y that is in all material respects identical to government action
X and is again challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment.
The court could simply apply the two rules separately and end up at the same constitutional
result. But it might instead take a shortcut and issue the following holding: “Government action
Y is identical to government action X, which we have already upheld under the dormant Com-
merce Clause and also the Second Amendment. Therefore, government action Y also comports
with the dormant Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment.” That holding could be
characterized as stemming from a “unified proposition of dormant Commerce Clause/Second
Amendment doctrine—namely, a proposition of the form: “Where the challenged government
action looks a lot like government action X, it is constitutionally valid.” Thus, if one charac-
terizes the relevant rules at a low enough level of generality, one might be able to find common
denominators that exist across seemingly unrelated areas of doctrine. At the same time, one
could also plausibly maintain that what is being consolidated here is not so much a generally
applicable “rule” of dormant Commerce Clause and Second Amendment doctrine as it is a set
of fact-specific holdings from a single, prior case.
114 I am rather confident in stating that two non-redundant rules should never be consoli-
dated. I am less confident in stating that two redundant rules must be consolidated. The reason
why has to do with the availability of another potential response to redundant doctrinal rules,
namely combination. In my view, that is, multiple, overlapping rules might still qualify as
“combinable” even where those rules turn out to mirror one another in scope and application.
Suppose, for instance, that the government has imposed a set of severe and racially dis-
criminatory prohibitions on the right to vote. Under operative equal-protection doctrine, the
“fundamental” nature of the burdened right would require the application of strict scrutiny,
see, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966), and so too would the
“suspect nature of the race-based classification, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The two rules might thus be thought to qualify as “totally redundant”
in a consolidation-worthy sense: both rules call for “strict scrutiny,” and so a court might simply
rely on a single application of the “strict scrutiny” test to dispose of both claims. But that is
not the only possible response to the overlapping (and arguably redundant) rules: One might
also, I think, treat the overlap as a reason to apply something more akin to “super strict scrutiny,”
reasoning that government action that twice implicates strict scrutiny is qualitatively more
constitutionally suspect than government action that does so only once. That’s not to say, of
course, that courts should always embrace combination in response to an overlapping set of
redundant rules: certainly we can imagine instances in which the combination approach might
not make sense. See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 1324–25 (suggesting that where
the government simultaneously discriminates on the basis of both sex and the marital status
of one’s parents, courts should not—on that basis alone—apply anything higher than the “in-
termediate” level of means/ends scrutiny that each form of discrimination would on its own
require, given that “one of the reasons why illegitimacy discrimination receives heightened scru-
tiny is that it is already a species of sex discrimination”). But courts ought at least to be able
to entertain that possibility before treating total redundancy as a categorical reason to consolidate.
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and substantive-due-process doctrine each call for rational basis review of the same
government action, it would be silly to apply and then reapply the same inquiry.)
Total redundancy, however, will very often be in the eye of the beholder, meaning
that consolidation’s appropriateness will depend to a large extent on what one
understands the overlapping rules respectively to protect. The presence or absence
of total redundancy can often represent a contested and contingent feature of a pair
of overlapping rules—a feature that courts actively choose to recognize, create, ignore,
and/or destroy. And where that is the case, simply instructing courts to “consolidate
when the rules are redundant” doesn’t really move the ball forward. On its own, that
instruction leaves unresolved the critical and more difficult question of when, if
ever, it makes sense to construe the overlapping rules in such a way that renders
them redundant in the total, consolidation-worthy sense.
This latter question requires further investigation, but I will offer three prelimi-
nary thoughts. First, by recognizing (or not recognizing) doctrinal redundancy, judges
can further their own substantive and ideological goals. For example, faced with a
favored and well-defined Rule A and a less-favored and less-well-defined Rule B,
courts can effectively redefine Rule B in terms of Rule A by simply insisting that the
two rules are in fact the same. (Recall, for instance, the Court’s maneuver in Martinez,
whereby it managed to avoid applying “strict scrutiny” to the all-comers policy by
treating the claimants’ expressive-association right as totally redundant with its free-
speech right.115) By “declaring” Rule B to be redundant with Rule A, the court could
effectively make it so, thus preventing Rule B from subsequently generating results
that Rule A itself could not plausibly support on its own. By the same token, if the court
favors the amorphous and vaguely defined Rule B while disfavoring the crisp and
constraining Rule A, it may strive to avoid linking the two rules together: by keeping
them separate, after all, the court gives Rule B the independence to evolve in a dif-
ferent and preferred direction.116
Second, and from a less substance-specific point of view, the formal recognition
of doctrinal redundancy implicates a familiar set of rules/standards tradeoffs. All
else equal, consolidation should yield decisional frameworks that are simpler, more
predictable, and easier to apply, at least as compared to frameworks in which multiple,
similar seeming rules both separately apply: When a court consolidates multiple rules
into a single rule, it reduces the total number of rules on whose applicability a con-
stitutional inquiry will depend, while also reducing the extent of cross-doctrinal con-
fusion and incoherence. At the same time, subtle but potentially significant variations
115 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680 (2010).
116 A similar stratagem likely undergirded the Court’s displacement decision in Graham:
By displacing substantive-due-process analysis with Fourth Amendment analysis in arrest-
related use-of-force cases, the court managed to clip the wings of a disfavored doctrinal rule
before it could ever become a source of robust protections against arrest-related conduct.)
See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 1351 (noting that the Court’s decision in Graham can
be seen as “expressing reluctance to adopt expansive views of substantive due process”).
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across the overlapping rules get abstracted away, calibration and error-correction
become more difficult to achieve, and the reduced set of potentially applicable rules
otherwise limits a court’s freedom to resolve a case in the manner it best sees fit.117
These tradeoffs are as familiar to lawyers and judges as they are difficult to resolve,
and I harbor no illusions that the choices are (or will be) any easier to navigate as ap-
plied to the problem we have considered here. (Indeed, the one definitive proposition
about rules and standards that I am willing to embrace is that the choice between
rules and standards ought itself to be governed by a standard and not a rule.) But in
recognizing that the decision whether to consolidate implicates the rules/standards
tradeoff, courts might usefully be able to draw on the wealth of insights and analyses
concerning the nature of that tradeoff itself.
Finally, where a court harbors uncertainty as to whether two or more rules
qualify as totally redundant (and where the court has otherwise concluded that the
rules should not be combined), the court should err on the side of separating rather
than consolidating. This is so because, all else equal, the costs of erroneously con-
solidating non-redundant rules are ultimately more significant than the costs of
erroneously separating redundant rules. Suppose, for instance, that a judge (or group
of judges) cannot decide whether two rules qualify as sufficiently coextensive to
warrant adoption of the consolidation approach. (The court, that is, has already ruled
out combination, but it is stuck on the question of whether to consolidate them.) In
my view, uncertainty on this score ought to militate in favor of separation and
against consolidation. The reason why has to do with the future implications of each
decision: Consolidating the rules for now would, in effect, register a definitive
conclusion that the rules are indeed redundant, yoking them together so as to ensure
that subsequent decisions within the zone of overlap will never permit those rules
to generate divergent results. Leaving the rules separated, by contrast, requires no
strong commitment in the opposite direction. Even if Rule A and Rule B turn out to
mirror one another in scope and substance, treating them as separate and alternative
grounds for constitutional relief does not force those rules to yield divergent results;
the rules, rather, could continue to evolve and develop in the same general way. All
of which is to suggest that it is likely more difficult for a court to reverse course
after consolidating two rules that really ought to be separated than to do so after
separating two rules that really ought to be consolidated. And that being so, a court
should err on the side of not consolidating potentially redundant rules unless it is
strongly committed to the proposition that the two rules are and should be treated
as fully duplicative of one another.
117 Cf. John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 709
(2016) (noting that a redundant doctrine can sometimes operate as a sort of “backstop or safety
valve” for other rules); F. Andrew Hessick, Doctrinal Redundancies, 67 ALA. L. REV. 635, 658
(2016) (noting that “[r]edundant [but separately applicable] doctrines expand the opportunity
for experimentation by potentially curtailing the effects of [precedential] constraints”).
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D. Displacement
We earlier observed that courts can approximate the effects of a displacement-
based decision by declaring one overlapping rule to be “partially redundant” with
another. (“Partial redundancy,” as we have defined it, exists where, within the zone
of overlap, it is impossible to violate one rule without also violating the other.) Here,
too, descriptive observation inspires normative prescription. Specifically, I want to
suggest that displacement is appropriate only when the overlapping rules qualify as
partially redundant in precisely this way. Put differently, if, within the zone of
overlap, Rules A and B each turn out to prohibit forms of government conduct that
the other rule does not, then courts should not displace one rule with the other.
Rather, courts should displace only where they can confidently proclaim that
everything prohibited by the displaced rule is (or at least should be) already prohib-
ited by the rule that does the displacing.
According to this proposition, the rightness or wrongness of a case like Graham
v. Connor would depend on what one understands each of the two overlapping rules
in Graham to prescribe. If one is prepared to maintain that arrest-related conduct can
never violate substantive due process without also violating the Fourth Amendment,
then displacement makes sense: it avoids inefficient and duplicative decisions while
sacrificing nothing in the way of diminished constitutional effectiveness. But if one
believes (or at least leaves the door open to the possibility) that the two clauses
might not be partially redundant—i.e., that some Fourth Amendment–compliant
arrests might nonetheless pose problems under substantive due process—then
Graham’s holding ought to be rejected. Under those circumstances, calling for dis-
placement is tantamount to calling for the non-enforcement of a relevant and at least
sometimes difference-making constitutional guarantee.
Put another way, displacement in the absence of partial redundancy will some-
times result in the explicit non-enforcement of meritorious constitutional claims.
That is, to be sure, not a fatal defect in and of itself: We can think of lots of procedural
and remedial rules that cause courts to “underenforce” constitutional guarantees—
Article III standing, the political question doctrine, qualified immunity doctrine, and
equity-based limits on injunctive relief all immediately come to mind.118 But at least
with those rules the Court puts its rights-withholding cards directly on the table,
identifying the relevant pragmatic and institutional reasons why under-enforcement
makes sense—apart from the merits of the claim—and making it clear to everyone
that under-enforcement is indeed the outcome being prescribed. With displacement,
by contrast, one rule is said not to apply because and only because some other con-
stitutional rule happens to exist. That justification makes sense if in fact the rules are
partially redundant; a Court can plausibly choose to ignore Rule A when a separate
118 See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Right-Remedy Equilibration and the Asymmetric Entrenchment
of Legal Entitlements, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2–3) (highlighting
these numerous doctrinal barriers to the judicial remediation of constitutional wrongs).
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Rule B already covers everything that Rule A would render actionable. But if the
rules are not in fact redundant in this sense, the rationale for displacing becomes
considerably more tenuous: at bottom, the suggestion would be that a potentially
meritorious claim under Rule B cannot be vindicated simply because a similar but
non-identical Rule A also exists. At the end of the day, we may have good reasons
for acknowledging the unrealistic demands of Chief Justice Marshall’s famous
stipulation that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”119 But we
need not similarly abandon the altogether different (and far less demanding) idea
that where there is a legal right, there is a legal right.
This conclusion casts doubt on the validity of the “more specific provision” rule
to which Graham has given rise.120 On the logic of that rule, recall, when two or
more rules overlap and one is “more specific” than the others, the “specificity” of
that rule provides sufficient reason for its exclusive application. But relative specific-
ity strikes me as the wrong guiding criterion: When a “more specific” rule overlaps
with a “more general” rule, the heightened specificity of the former should not auto-
matically render the latter irrelevant to the inquiry: It is, much to the contrary, quite
possible that the more general rule might, by virtue of its broader scope, end up pro-
hibiting forms of conduct that the more specific rule allows.121 (If one rule prohibits
me from driving speedily and another rule prohibits me from driving recklessly,
should the relative specificity of the “no-speeding” rule really give me a free pass to
engage in slow-but-reckless driving?) All of which is simply to say that, if the displace-
ment rule of Graham is to carry continued significance, partial redundancy—and
not relative specificity—really ought to be its lodestar. Displacement makes good
sense where the rule being displaced is best understood as prohibiting nothing more
than the rule doing the displacing. Outside that set of circumstances, however, ad-
herence to the “more specific provision rule” can result in opaque and unjustified
constrictions of substantive rights.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional overlap arises when multiple, rights-based provisions simulta-
neously (and plausibly) bear on the constitutionality of the same government action.
Courts can respond to the presence of overlap not just by “combining” together the
overlapping rules, but also by consolidating them into a single rule that captures
their shared, redundant commands, or by simply stipulating that one of the rules
should apply in lieu of all others. And, of course, courts can choose to ignore the
overlap altogether, treating each of the overlapping rules as setting forth a totally
119 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
120 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).
121 It is perhaps for this reason that, as Professors Abrams and Garrett have noted, the
“more specific provision rule” is often simply ignored. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8,
at 1351 (highlighting “countless examples of the Court taking the opposite approach”).
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separate and independent basis for invalidating its decision. I have further suggested
that courts should work through the choice of response in a systematic and methodical
way, and I have offered a non-exhaustive set of guiding principles to assist in that
endeavor. Among other things, courts should treat the separation approach as the de-
fault response, they should consider the appropriateness of “combining” two rules
before considering the appropriateness of consolidating the rules or displacing one
of the rules with another, and they should evaluate the appropriateness of displacement
not by reference to the relative specificity of overlapping rules, but rather by reference
to the question of whether one of the overlapping rules logically subsumes the others.
Much remains to be filled in, but I hope for now to have persuaded the reader
that: (a) some sort of framework is needed for thinking through responses to consti-
tutional overlap, given the frequency with which instances of overlap occur; (b) the
categories underlying the framework reflect meaningfully different responses that
carry meaningfully different consequences; and (c) the prescriptive suggestions
concerning the framework provide at least a useful starting point for bringing some
structure and coherence to what will otherwise remain an incoherent hodgepodge
of choices. Short of that, however, my even less ambitious hope is to have persuaded
the reader that constitutional overlap is worthy of further study—study that addresses
itself to more than just the question of when, if ever, rights can and should be “com-
bined.” There remains much to be said about where constitutional overlap comes
from, what it really looks like, and how the doctrine ought to handle it. Judges,
litigants, and scholars would thus do well to think carefully and systematically about
its interpretive and methodological dimensions. In so doing, they will be harvesting
from one of the many fertile fields that Professor Zick has been tilling.
